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Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with
opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated
moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it
is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting
dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we were able to use
functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural correlates of intuitive and counterintuitive judgments across a
range of moral situations. Irrespective of content (utilitarian/deontological), counterintuitive moral judgments were associated
with greater difficulty and with activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting that such judgments may involve
emotional conflict; intuitive judgments were linked to activation in the visual and premotor cortex. In addition, we obtained
evidence that neural differences in moral judgment in such dilemmas are largely due to whether they are intuitive and not, as
previously assumed, to differences between utilitarian and deontological judgments. Our findings therefore do not support
theories that have generally associated utilitarian and deontological judgments with distinct neural systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Is it morally permissible to kill a stranger by pushing him
onto the track of a runaway trolley in order to save the lives
of five others? To sacrifice one life to save five is to act in line
with utilitarianism, the view that we should maximize aggre-
gate well-being, regardless of the means employed (Singer,
2005). By contrast, deontological ethical views such as
Kant’s ethics hold that we must obey certain duties even
when this leads to a worse outcome. Many deontologists
thus think that it would be wrong to kill the stranger
(Kamm, 2000).
Recent neuroimaging studies of moral-decision making
have focused on such extreme moral dilemmas (Greene
et al., 2001, 2004). Utilitarian (well-being maximizing) judg-
ments were found to be associated with longer response
times (RT) and with increased activation in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and inferior parietal lobe, areas
implicated in deliberative processing; deontological judg-
ments were associated with greater activation in areas related
to affective processing, such as the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, the superior temporal sulcus and the amygdala.
These differences in neural activation have been interpreted
to reflect distinct neural sub-systems that underlie utilitarian
and deontological moral judgments not only in the context
of such extreme dilemmas, but quite generally (Greene,
2008).
However, this general theoretical proposal requires further
investigation, given that dilemmas involving extreme harm
to others are only one kind of moral context in which utili-
tarian and deontological judgments conflict. Moreover, such
extreme moral dilemmas are distinctive in an important way.
When asked whether to push a stranger to save five, a large
majority chooses the deontological option, a decision that
appears to be based on immediate intuitions (Cushman
et al., 2006), in line with extensive psychological evidence
that moral judgments are often made in this automatic way
(Haidt, 2001). Utilitarian judgments in such dilemmas are
often highly counterintuitive because they conflict with a
stringent duty not to harm. Utilitarian choices, however,
can also conflict with less stringent duties, such as duties
not to lie or break promises (Ross, 1930/2002). In such
cases, it’s often the deontological choice that appears strongly
counterintuitive, as in Kant’s notorious contention that lying
is forbidden even to prevent murder (Kant, 1797/1966).
Most people believe that we are permitted to break a promise
or lie if this is necessary to prevent great harm to others.
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Prior research has therefore not distinguished two distinct
variables: the content of a moral judgment whether it is
utilitarian or not and how intuitive or immediately compel-
ling this judgment is to most people. Thus the reported
differences between utilitarian and deontological judgments
might be due to the greater intuitiveness of deontological
choices in the moral dilemmas previously examined, rather
than to a general division between utilitarian and deonto-
logical modes of moral judgment. Prior neuroimaging
studies therefore offer only limited measures of the neural
processes that might generally underlie deontological and
utilitarian judgments. More importantly, they offer only lim-
ited measures of the processes that might generally underlie
intuitive and counterintuitive judgments. Consequently, this
key division in the psychology of moral decision-making has
not yet been directly investigated at the neural level.
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in
healthy volunteers, we investigated the neural bases of intui-
tive and counterintuitive moral judgments across different
types of moral situations, while controlling for their content.
We used a selection of the extreme dilemmas used in prior
studies which were controlled for content and intuitiveness,
as well as new dilemmas involving different contexts, where
intuitiveness and content were reversed (‘Materials and
Methods’ section). This design allowed us to investigate
not only the neural correlates of intuitive and counterintui-
tive moral judgments, but also the neural correlates of utili-
tarian and deontological judgments across a range of moral
contexts, when intuitiveness is controlled.
We hypothesized that counterintuitive judgments are
associated with controlled processing regardless of their con-
tent. If the content of a judgment is more critical than its
intuitiveness, we would expect similar brain activations for
the same content (e.g., utilitarian judgment), irrespective of
intuitiveness. At the behavioural level, an increased cognitive
effort during utilitarian judgments should be reflected
in higher difficulty ratings and longer RTs. By contrast, if
‘intuitiveness’ is the critical factor as we hypothesize, then,
irrespective of the content of judgments (utilitarian vs de-
ontological), similar neural activations should be observed
for judgments of the same degree of intuitiveness (intuitive
vs counterintuitive), and counterintuitive judgments should
be associated with longer RTs and higher difficulty ratings.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Sixteen healthy, right-handed subjects (9 females, mean age:
29.25 years, range: 21–41) participated in the study. The
volunteers were pre-assessed to exclude those with a previ-
ous history of neurological or psychiatric illness. All subjects
gave informed consent, and the study was approved by the
local Research Ethics Committee.
Experimental procedures
To study the differential effect of the content (deontological/
utilitarian) and the intuitiveness (intuitive/counterintuitive)
of the judgment, we used two different sets of dilemmas:
scenarios where the utilitarian option is intuitive (UI
dilemmas) and scenarios where the deontological judgment
is intuitive (DI dilemmas; for criteria of classification, see
‘Stimuli’ section). Depending on the decision of the par-
ticipant, trials were subsequently classified as (i) DI_U: DI
dilemma, utilitarian decision, (ii) DI_D: DI dilemma,
deontological decision, (iii) UI_U: UI dilemma, utilitarian
decision and (iv) UI_D: UI dilemma, deontological decision.
The experiment was divided into four sessions, each last-
ing for  10min. The order of presentation of DI and
UI dilemmas was randomized throughout. Each dilemma
was presented as text through a series of three screens.
The first two described a dilemma, and the third suggested
a possible solution. After reading the third screen, subjects
responded by pressing one of two buttons indicating
whether they agreed with the suggested solution (‘yes’ or
‘no’). For half the subjects, the left button was used for
‘yes’, for the other half pressing the left button indicated
disagreement with the suggested solution (‘no’).
Participants were instructed to read the text and press the
button as soon as they had made their decision. No visual
feedback was given upon decision.
On arrival, participants were provided with written task
instructions and gave their informed consent. They were told
that the purpose of the study was to investigate decision-
making in moral situations. They were assured that the study
was not a test of moral integrity. Subsequently, all partici-
pants filled in personality questionnaires (data not shown
here). Once they were positioned in the MR scanner, par-
ticipants were familiarized with the presentation of the
dilemmas, the response box and the rating procedure (see
below). A test paradigm was run with two example dilemmas
to acquaint subjects with the structure of the experiment.
The dilemmas were displayed on a black screen (white let-
ters, font: Arial) located above the feet of the subjects. A test
image was presented on the screen prior to scanning to
ensure that the image was in focus and the participant
could comfortably read the text. At the end of each dilemma
subjects were prompted to rate its difficulty using a
Numerical Rating Scale ranging from 0 (¼‘not difficult at
all’) to 100 (¼‘very difficult’). Participants were given 6s
for the rating. At the end of each trial, subjects were in-
structed to fixate a white cross that was displayed in the
centre of the screen for 12s (baseline). The time between
presentation of the third part of the dilemma and the
button press indicating the subject’s decision were recorded
as RT (in ms).
Stimuli
We used scenarios where one of a range of moral duties (e.g.
not to lie or kill) conflicts with choosing the outcome with
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For simplicity, we refer to the latter option as ‘utilitarian’
and the former as ‘deontological’, although ‘utilitarian’
choices in this sense needn’t imply an overall utilitarian out-
look (Kahane and Shackel, 2008; 2010). The scenarios
included a selection of ‘personal’ dilemmas previously used
by Greene et al. (2001, 2004) as well as new dilemmas
(Supplementary Data). In order to classify the scenarios
into DI and UI dilemmas, all scenarios were pre-assessed
by 18 independent judges who reported their unreflective
response to each dilemma. On this basis, 8 dilemmas for
which 12 or more judges chose the deontological option
were classified as ‘deontological intuitive’ (DI), and 10 di-
lemmas for which 12 or more judges chose the utilitarian
option as ‘utilitarian intuitive’ (UI). As expected, most DI
dilemmas were scenarios previously used by Greene et al.
(2001, 2004) where the better consequence required violating
a duty not to harm (five out of eight DI dilemmas;
Supplementary Data), and most UI dilemmas involved a
conflict between the better consequence and other duties
(e.g. not to lie).
Image acquisition
A 3 T scanner (Oxford Magnet Technology, Oxford, UK)
was used to acquire T2*-weighted echoplanar images (repe-
tition time: 2.38s, echo time: 30ms; flip angle: 908; matrix:
64 64; field of view: 192 192 mm
2; slice thickness: 3mm)
with BOLD contrast.
Data analysis
The numbers of intuitive and counterintuitive judgments
were compared separately for both types of dilemmas
using paired t-tests. Pearson correlation coefficients were
calculated for the correlation between (i) the number of
counterintuitive judgments in UI and DI dilemmas,
(ii) the number of utilitarian judgments in both types of
dilemmas. For RT and difficulty ratings we used an
ANOVA to analyse the difference between (i) utilitarian
and deontological judgments, (ii) intuitive and counterintui-
tive judgments and (iii) between UI and DI dilemmas
(all main effects). Furthermore, RT and difficulty ratings
were analyzed separately for each type of dilemma using
paired t-tests.
Pre-processing and statistical analysis of the fMRI data
were carried out using SPM5 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
The first five image volumes of each session were discarded
to account for T1 relaxation effects. The remaining volumes
were realigned to the sixth volume to correct for head
motion before statistical analysis. The EPI images were spa-
tially normalized (Friston et al., 1995) to the template of
the Montre ´al Neurological Institute (MNI; Evans et al.,
1993). The normalized EPI-images were smoothed using
an 8-mm full-width at half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian
kernel, temporally high-pass filtered (cut-off 128s) and
corrected for temporal autocorrelations using first-order
autoregressive modelling. For each subject, contrast images
were calculated for each of the four possible outcomes
(i.e. UI_U, UI_D, DI_U, DI_D). Given that all informa-
tionaboutthedilemmaswasavailablewiththepresentationof
the second screen and in order to capture the early phase of
decision-making, decision-related activity was modelled as
events from 4s prior to the presentation of the question
(third screen) until the button press indicating the decision.
The remaining time until the end of the third screen as well as
the time of the first and second screen were modelled as
regressors-of-no-interest. First level contrasts were taken to
the second level for the group data analysis using a flexible
factorial design within a random effects model.
Data analysis on the group level was divided into two
stages. First, we investigated all three main effects to identify
brain regions generally associated with the content (utilitar-
ian/deontological) and intuitiveness of the decision (intui-
tive/counterintuitive) as well as with the type of dilemma
(DI/UI). Brain regions activated during intuitive and coun-
terintuitive moral judgments were identified comparing both
types of decisions irrespective of their utilitarian or deonto-
logical content (analysis A; Figure 1A). Likewise, utilitarian
and deontological moral judgments were compared pooled
across intuitive and counterintuitive decisions (analysis B,
Figure 1B). Finally, brain responses to the two types of
dilemmas were compared, irrespective of the decision
made (analysis C, Figure 1C). Note that this last analysis
is statistically identical to the interaction analysis between
content and intuitiveness.
At the second stage of the analysis, we tested whether
neural differences between the utilitarian and deontological
judgments in DI dilemmas were due to intuitiveness or
content (Figure 1, analyses D and E). To this end, we com-
pared one judgment to the contrary judgment within DI
dilemmas, e.g. DI_U>DI_D (analysis D). The results of
these comparisons are ambiguous given that the two options
differ both in content and in intuitiveness. We therefore
performed additional analyses where we compared the
same judgment (e.g. DI_U) to the two options in the
other type of dilemma [i.e. ‘DI_U>UI_U’ (analysis D1)
and ‘DI_U>UI_D’ (analysis D2)]. In order to test for simi-
larities between these additional analyses and the original
comparison, we used the result of the original comparison
(DI_U vs DI_D) as an inclusive mask (P<0.05, uncorrected)
in the two subsequent analyses (D1 and D2). As our DI
dilemmas are closest to dilemmas previously used (e.g.
Greene et al., 2004), we only report below findings on this
type of dilemma; for analyses of UI dilemmas see
Supplementary Tables S10–S13). For consistency reasons, a
global threshold was set at P<0.001 uncorrected for all ana-
lyses with a minimum cluster extent of five continguous
voxels. Activation clusters surviving a more conservative
threshold of P<0.05 FWE-corrected are marked with an
asterisk in the Supplementary Tables. All coordinates are
given in MNI space.
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Behavioural data
Decisions
In both types of dilemmas, participants chose the intuitive
option more often than the counterintuitive option [UI di-
lemmas: t(15)¼5.81, P<0.001; DI dilemmas: t(15)¼ 4.16,
P¼0.001; Figure 2A]. The number of counterintuitive judg-
ments was not correlated between categories (r¼0.14,
P¼0.606). Likewise, the number of utilitarian judgments
in UI dilemmas was not correlated with the number of utili-
tarian judgments in DI dilemmas (r¼ 0.14, P¼0.599).
RT and difficulty ratings
For RT and difficulty ratings, we first tested whether utili-
tarian judgments took longer and were perceived as more
difficult. A comparison of utilitarian and deontological
moral judgments across dilemmas revealed no significant
difference in difficulty rating [F(1,11)¼0.06, P¼0.811;
Figure 2B] or RT [F(1,11)¼0.314, P¼0.586; Figure 2C].
In contrast, a significant difference in perceived difficulty
was observed between intuitive and counterintuitive judg-
ments, the latter being more difficult [F(1,11)¼24.95,
P<0.001]. RT were not significantly different between
intuitive and counterintuitive decisions [F(1,11)¼0.272,
P¼0.612]. However, given that decisions in DI dilemmas
took longer [F(1,11)¼7.627, P¼0.018] and received higher
difficulty ratings than in UI dilemmas [F(1,11)¼18.917,
P¼0.001], we performed additional analyses on both meas-
ures separately for both types of dilemmas. RTs were not
significantly different between both options [DI dilemmas:
t(13)¼0.029, P¼0.977; UI dilemmas: t(13)¼ 0.550,
P¼0.592]. However, in DI dilemmas the counterintuitive
utilitarian decision was perceived as more difficult [t(13)¼
2.564, P¼0.024], whereas in UI dilemmas the counterintui-
tive deontological judgment got higher difficulty ratings
[t(13)¼ 2.747, P¼0.017].
Neuroimaging data: effects of intuitiveness, content
and type of dilemma
Intuitive vs counterintuitive moral judgments
The contrast ‘intuitive>counterintuitive decisions’ revealed
significant effects in the visual cortex, left premotor cortex,
bilateral mid temporal lobe (extending into the right
temporal pole) and left lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC;
Figure 3A and Supplementary Table S1). The reverse con-
trast (‘counterintuitive>intuitive decisions’) showed signifi-
cant effects in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC)
extending into the dorsal part of the ACC, right secondary
somatosensory cortex (SII) extending into the primary som-
atosensory cortex (SI) and posterior insula, bilateral mid
insula extending into the temporal lobe, right ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and lateral OFC (Figure 3B and
Supplementary Table S2).
Fig. 1 Overview of fMRI data analysis. (A) Brain responses to utilitarian moral judgments (UI_U and DI_U) were compared to responses to deontological moral judgments (UI_D
and DI_D). (B) Comparison of intuitive (UI_U and DI_D) vs counterintuitive moral judgments (UI_D and DI_U). (C) Comparison of moral judgments in DI dilemmas (DI_D and
DI_U) vs judgments in UI dilemmas (UI_U and UI_D). (D) Comparison of single conditions. In analysis D, utilitarian judgments in DI dilemmas were compared to (i) deontological
judgments in DI dilemmas (DI_U vs DI_D; analysis D), (ii) utilitarian judgments in UI dilemmas (DI_U vs UI_U; analysis D1) and (iii) deontological judgments in UI dilemmas
(DI_U vs UI_D; analysis D2). Analysis E (deontological judgments in DI dilemmas) follows a parallel form. The dilemma that is substracted is marked in green, the dilemma that is
subtracted from is marked in red.
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Brain responses in deontological and utilitarian judgments
were next compared irrespective of dilemma type. Utilitarian
judgments showed no specific significant activation, whereas
deontological judgments were characterized by an increased
activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and right
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ; Figure 4, Supplementary
Table S3).
Moral judgments in DI vs UI dilemmas
Compared to UI dilemmas, DI dilemmas exhibited stronger
activation in the right DLPFC extending into VLPFC, the
right TPJ and the occipital lobe (Figure 5; Supplementary
Table S4). UI dilemmas did not show any specific significant
activation relative to DI dilemmas.
Neuroimaging data: content vs intuitiveness
DI dilemmas: utilitarian>deontological moral
judgments (DI_U>DI_D; analysis D)
This analysis revealed increased activation in the right mid
insula, lateral OFC on both sides extending into the VLPFC
on the right side, in rACC, right SII and left superior tem-
poral lobe (Figure 6, analysis D; Supplementary Table S5).
The activations identified in this contrast were used as an
inclusive mask for two subsequent analyses. Comparing
DI_U with UI_D (both counterintuitive, different content)
revealed overlapping activations in the visual cortex only
(Figure 6, analysis D1; Supplementary Table S6). In contrast,
the comparison between DI_U and UI_U (different intui-
tiveness, both utilitarian judgments) showed an overlap with
result D in the rACC, right VLPFC and SII, as well as the
visual cortex and cerebellum (Figure 6, analysis D2;
Supplementary Table S7). Finally, ROI analyses on regions
previously reported for utilitarian judgment using similar
dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004; see Supplementary
Methods) revealed no significant activation.
DI dilemmas: deontological>utilitarian moral
judgments (DI_D>DI_U; analysis E)
In DI dilemmas, intuitive deontological judgments were
accompanied by increased activation in the visual cortex,
bilateral temporal lobe covering more posterior parts on
the left side and more anterior parts including the temporal
pole on the left side. Additional activation was observed in
the left premotor and supplementary motor regions as well
as in lateral OFC on both sides (Figure 6, analysis E;
Fig. 2 Behavioral data. (A) Relative number of utilitarian and non-utilitarian judgments (averaged across subjects) in DI dilemmas where the deontological option was considered
intuitive and UI dilemmas where the utilitarian option was considered intuitive. Participants chose the intuitive option significantly more often than the counterintuitive option in
both types of dilemmas (P 0.001). (B) Difficulty rating for utilitarian and deontological judgments in DI and UI dilemmas averaged across subjects. In both types of dilemmas,
counterintuitive judgments were rated as more difficult compared to intuitive judgments (P<0.05). (C) Response times for utilitarian and non-utilitarian judgments in DI and UI
dilemmas averaged across subjects. Significantly longer response times were found for DI than for UI dilemmas but not for counterintuitive compared to intuitive judgments. Error
bars show standard errors.
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UI_U (both intuitive, different content) revealed no signifi-
cant overlap with the result of analysis E (Figure 6, analysis
E1). In contrast, the comparison of DI_D with UI_D (dif-
ferent intuitiveness, same content) showed significant over-
lap with the result of analysis E in the visual cortex, left
premotor cortex and bilateral OFC (Figure 6, analysis E2;
Supplementary Table S9).
DISCUSSION
Our study aimed to identify the behavioural and neural cor-
relates of intuitive and counterintuitive judgments, when
content is controlled, and the correlates of deontological
and utilitarian judgments, when intuitiveness is controlled,
allowing us to disentangle the distinct contributions made
by intuitiveness and content to the processes involved in
responses to moral dilemmas.
Previous neuroimaging studies reported that utilitarian
judgments in dilemmas involving extreme harm were asso-
ciated with activation in the DLPFC and parietal lobe
(Greene et al., 2004). This finding has been taken as evidence
that utilitarian judgment is generally driven by controlled
processing (Greene, 2008). The behavioural and neural
data we obtained suggest instead that differences between
utilitarian and deontological judgments in dilemmas invol-
ving extreme harm largely reflect differences in intuitiveness
rather than in content.
Overall, counterintuitive judgments were perceived as
more difficult than intuitive judgments, whereas there was
no significant difference in perceived difficulty between utili-
tarian and deontological judgments. At the neural level,
counterintuitive and intuitive decisions analysed across the
two types of dilemmas were characterized by robust activa-
tion in extended networks, as discussed below. In contrast,
Fig. 3 Comparison of brain responses to intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgments. (A) Intuitive moral judgments were associated with increased activation in the visual,
premotor and orbitofrontal cortex and the temporal lobe. (B) During counterintuitive moral judgments, increased activation was observed in the dorsal and rostral ACC, SII, insula,
VLPFC and OFC.
Fig. 5 Comparison of brain responses to moral judgments in DI and UI dilemmas.
During moral judgments in DI dilemmas, increased activation was found in the right
VLPFC and DLPFC, PCC, right TPJ. No significant activation was found for the
comparison ‘UI dilemmas>DI dilemmas’.
Fig. 4 Comparison of brain responses to deontological and utilitarian moral judg-
ments. Deontological moral judgments led to increased activation in the PCC and the
right TPJ. No significant activation was found for the comparison ‘utilitarian>de-
ontological moral judgments’.
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tent (i.e. pooling across intuitive and counterintuitive deci-
sions), deontological judgments showed increased activation
in the PCC and right TPJ, but not in brain regions previously
associated with deontological decisions (Greene et al. 2001,
2004). Utilitarian judgments did not exhibit any specific sig-
nificant activations.
To further investigate whether neural differences were
due to intuitiveness rather than content of the judgment,
we performed the additional analyses D–G (Figure 6 and
Supplementary Figures S1 and S2). When we controlled
for content, these analyses showed considerable overlap for
intuitiveness. In contrast, when we controlled for intuitive-
ness, only little if any overlap was found for content. Our
results thus speak against the influential interpretation of
previous neuroimaging studies as supporting a general asso-
ciation between deontological judgment and automatic pro-
cessing, and between utilitarian judgment and controlled
processing.
Importantly, similar results were obtained even when we
considered only the contrast between utilitarian and deonto-
logical judgments in DI dilemmas (Figure 6), a category of
dilemmas that strongly overlaps with that used in previous
studies. In contrast to the results reported by Greene et al.
(2004), we found that utilitarian judgments in such di-
lemmas were associated with activation in the right mid
insula, lateral OFC, right VLPFC, rACC, right SII and left
superior temporal lobe (Figure 6). Furthermore, region-of
interest analyses of the previously reported locations in the
DLPFC and parietal lobe (Greene et al., 2004) revealed no
significant result. This divergence from previously reported
findings is not entirely unexpected given that we used only a
selection of previously used dilemmas that were controlled
for intuitiveness and content (Supplementary Data), and
given that behavioural studies of ‘personal’ dilemmas that
used better controlled stimuli (Greene et al., 2008; Moore
et al., 2008) failed to fully replicate the behavioral findings
reported in Greene et al., 2001, 2004. In addition, our ana-
lyses show that the neural differences observed between utili-
tarian and deontological judgments in DI dilemmas were
almost entirely due to differences in intuitiveness rather
than content, in line with our hypothesis. Our findings
thus suggest that even in the context of the extreme moral
dilemmas previously studied, the neural activations asso-
ciated with utilitarian judgments might be due to their
counter-intuitiveness, not their content.
The neural bases of intuitive and counterintuitive
moral judgments
Although recent research has established a key role to intu-
ition in moral judgment (Haidt, 2001), the biological under-
pinnings of moral intuitions, and of moral judgments that
go against intuition, have not yet been previously studied.
Our findings shed light on the neural processes that underlie
such judgments, and provide partial support for the
hypothesized association between intuitive judgment and
Fig. 6 Analysis of the role of intuitiveness and content in judgments of DI dilemmas. (A) Analysis D (DI_U>DI_D): compared to deontological moral judgments in DI dilemmas,
utilitarian judgments were associated with increased activation in the right insula, VLPFC, SII, left OFC, rACC and visual cortex. (D1) Of these regions, only the visual cortex was
also activated in the comparison of DI_U with deontological judgments in UI dilemmas (indicated by green dots). (D2) In contrast, overlap with the results of analysis D was
found in the VLPFC, rACC, SII and visual cortex when DI_U was compared with utilitarian judgments in UI dilemmas (indicated by red dots). Analysis E (DI_D>DI_U): compared
to utilitarian moral judgments in DI dilemmas, deontological judgments were associated with increased activation in the visual cortex, bilateral temporal lobe, left premotor and
right orbitofrontal cortex. (E1) Of these regions, none showed increased activation when DI_D was compared with utilitarian judgments in UI dilemmas (indicated by green dots).
(E2) In contrast, overlap was found in the visual, premotor and orbitofrontal cortex when DI_D was compared with deontological judgments in UI dilemmas (indicated by
red dots).
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ment and controlled processing.
Despite substantial differences in content between the
different types of dilemmas, similar patterns of neural activa-
tion were observed for intuitive compared to counterintuitive
judgment, and for the reverse comparison, within each
category of dilemma, suggesting that common neural pro-
cesses underlie intuitive and counterintuitive judgments
regardless of content. This is a significant finding given that
different types of moral scenarios are likely to elicit different
kinds of intuitions or emotional responses, and it cannot
be assumed a priori that common neural processes would
underlie moral intuitions in different contexts.
Intuitive moral judgments
Judgments were classified as intuitive if chosen by a large
majority of independent judges who reported their immedi-
ate, unreflective moral response (‘Materials and Methods’
section and Supplementary Results). It is likely that such
judgments were driven by moral intuitions immediate
focused responses disposing people to make certain kinds
of moral judgments (Haidt, 2001; Hauser, 2006). However,
although intuitive judgments were easier to make than coun-
terintuitive ones, as we predicted, they were not associated
with shorter RTs. This last finding is in line with recent
studies which failed to replicate the previously reported RT
differences in moral judgment when better controlled stimuli
were used (Moore et al., 2008) or found such differences
only in the context of cognitive load (Greene et al., 2008).
It is currently under debate whether affective processes
play a key role in intuitive moral judgments (Haidt, 2001;
Hauser, 2006; Valdesolo and Steno, 2006; Koenigs et al.,
2007; Moll and de Oliveira-Souza, 2007; Greene, 2008;
Huebner et al., 2009). If intuitive judgments are driven by
affective responses, they should be associated with increased
activation in emotion-related brain areas such as amygdala,
OFC, nucleus accumbens or ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(Sanfey and Chang, 2008). However, we found no increased
activation in these areas during intuitive moral judgments
(Figure 3A), not even within DI dilemmas, the category of di-
lemmas that strongly overlaps with the dilemmas previously
studied.
Instead, a heightened signal level was observed in the
visual and left premotor cortex (Figures 3 and 6). Since
this result was unexpected, further research is needed to
clarify the function of these regions in intuitive judgments.
One possibility is that this activation reflects greater im-
aginative and empathetic engagement with the dilemmas,
in line with evidence showing that the visual cortex is acti-
vated not only during visual perception but also during
visual imagery (O’Craven and Kanwisher, 2000; Lambert
et al., 2004), and that this activation correlates with the viv-
idness of the imagery (Cui et al., 2007). Premotor cortex
activation has been associated with emotional empathy
(Nummenmaa et al., 2008) and with empathy as a form of
‘emotional perspective-taking’ (Lamm et al., 2007). Since
these areas were not previously noted as central to moral
cognition (Moll et al., 2005), it seems plausible that the
observed neural activity reflects not the processes directly
underlying intuitive judgments, but the processes that trigger
them by making aspects of a moral situation more salient.
Our findings thus indicate a possible role for affective pro-
cessing in triggering intuitive moral judgments, but they do
not provide direct support for the view that intuitive moral
judgments are generally based in emotion.
Counterintuitive moral judgment
At the neural level, high-level controlled processes such as
problem-solving and planning have consistently been shown
to engage the ACC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as well
as the posterior parietal cortex (Sanfey and Chang, 2008). Of
these structures, only the ACC was significantly activated
during counterintuitive moral judgment (Figure 3B).
However, the ACC activation found in the present study
was mainly located in the rostral subdivision of the ACC
whereas activations related to controlled cognitive process-
ing are commonly found more dorsally (Beckmann et al.,
2009).
There are several possible roles that the rACC might
play in generating counterintuitive judgment. The rACC
has been implicated in the calculation of costs and benefits
(Rudebeck et al., 2006; Walton et al., 2007) and emotional
conflict resolution (Etkin et al., 2006). The rACC activation
we observed might reflect the conflict experienced when sub-
jects overcame affect-laden intuitions (Greene et al., 2004).
However, activation in the rACC gyrus matching the cluster
found here has recently been shown to reflect the valuation
of social information in primates (Rudebeck et al., 2006) and
humans (Behrens et al., 2008). Increased rACC activation has
been tied to representation of what others think about us
(Amodio and Frith, 2006), as well as to guilt, an emotional
response to the belief that one has violated moral standards
(Zahn et al., 2009). Thus it is also possible that participants
were aware that their choice goes against the socially dom-
inant moral view and could be perceived negatively by
others.
The association between counterintuitive judgments and
greater perceived difficulty and rACC activation partially
supports the hypothesis that counterintuitive judgments in-
volve controlled processing. However, given that counter-
intuitive judgments were not associated with longer RT or
activation in areas implicated in higher-level deliberative
processing, it remains unclear whether they involve con-
scious moral reasoning.
Prior dual process models of moral judgment have pre-
sented controlled processing as generating utilitarian moral
conclusions through explicit reasoning, and that these coun-
terintuitive conclusions then overcome more intuitive
deontological responses (Greene et al., 2004). Since in UI
dilemmas the counterintuitive conclusion was deontological
400 SCAN (2012) G. Kahane etal.in content, it is unlikely that controlled processing in moral
decision-making is generally associated with utilitarian rea-
soning. Instead, in UI dilemmas such processing might in-
volve the application of explicit moral rules (e.g. ‘do not lie’).
It is also possible, however, that controlled processing does
not generate novel moral responses through explicit reason-
ing but instead resolves conflict between pre-existing com-
peting moral intuitions, for example, by deciding between
concern for others’ welfare and an aversion to lying.
Deontological and utilitarian judgments are specific to
a moral context
As reported above, our findings do not support a general
association between deontological judgments and automatic
processing, and between utilitarian judgments and con-
trolled processing. In line with this, we did not find signifi-
cant shared activations between utilitarian judgments across
categories. However, we did find that activation in the PCC
and TPJ was associated with deontological compared to
utilitarian judgments when these were pooled across DI
and UI dilemmas (Figure 4, Supplementary Table S3).
Such activation was also the only judgment-specific brain
activation that could not be explained by intuitiveness.
This finding is especially interesting given that the dilemmas
we used involved a range of different duties, ranging from
constraints on killing to duties concerning promising and
fairness. PCC activation has previously been observed in
moral processing (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Moll et al.,
2002), and implicated in autobiographical memory recall
and self-relevant emotional processing (Summerfield et al.,
2009) and in tasks which require adopting the first-person
perspective (Vogeley et al., 2004). The TPJ has been impli-
cated in theory of mind tasks (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003;
Saxe and Wexler, 2005), and in tasks involving self-
awareness and agency (Decety and Lamm, 2007). Although
scenarios concerning lying in UI dilemmas are likely to have
engaged theory of mind capacities, it is not likely that they
drive this effect given that deontological judgments within
UI dilemmas were not associated with greater TPJ activation
compared to utilitarian ones (Supplementary Table S10).
Although the observed TPJ activity might nevertheless reflect
the central role of intention in determining permissibility in
deontological ethics, the association between deontological
judgments and increased activation in PCC and TPJ is also
intriguingly in line with an influential understanding of such
judgments as involving concern with one’s own agency and
its emotional significance (Williams, 1973), suggesting a pos-
sible connection between deontological judgment and affect-
ive processing. However, further research is needed to clarify
the role of the PCC and TPJ in deontological judgment, and
to determine whether they are also implicated in other forms
of deontological judgment.
Importantly, a tendency to utilitarian or deontological
judgments within one category (DI or UI dilemmas) did
not correlate with such a tendency in the other, suggesting
that the moral judgments of non-philosophers are not based
in explicit moral theories such as utilitarianism or Kantian
ethics (Kahane and Shackel, 2010). Rather, they appear to be
case-dependent, so that individuals can be strongly disposed
to make utilitarian judgments in one type of moral context
but not in another. This suggestion is supported by studies
of patients with VMPFC lesions which show an abnormally
frequent tendency to make utilitarian judgments in personal
dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007), but also an abnormally
frequent tendency to make vindictive responses in the
Ultimatum game (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007), arguably an
abnormal deontological response (Moll and de Oliveira-
Souza, 2007; Kahane and Shackel, 2010).
CONCLUSION
A central strand of research into moral decision-making has
focused on dilemmas involving extreme life and death situ-
ations. On the basis of fMRI studies of such dilemmas, a
general account of the neural mechanisms underlying utili-
tarian and deontological moral judgments has been pro-
posed (Greene et al., 2004, 2008). By using a wider range
of dilemmas and controlling for the distinct contribution of
content and intuitiveness, we obtained evidence suggesting
that behavioural and neural differences in responses to such
dilemmas are largely due to differences in intuitiveness, not
to general differences between utilitarian and deontological
judgment. Our findings suggest that the distinction between
intuitive and counterintuitive judgments is a more funda-
mental division in moral decision-making, and thus high-
light the importance of distinguishing the processes generally
implicated in intuitive and counterintuitive moral judg-
ments from the content of such judgments in particular
contexts. Indeed, a better understanding of the processes
that generate common intuitive responses to moral situ-
ations, and of the capacities that nevertheless allow some
individuals to arrive at highly counterintuitive conclusions,
could shed new light on the sources of pervasive forms of
moral consensus and disagreement.
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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